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Collapsible Corporations in a Nutshell
BORIS I. BITTKER AND JAMES S. EUSTICE 0
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 331(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a
complete liquidation of a corporation is to be treated by a share-
holder as a sale of his stock, and section 334(a) provides that a
shareholder's basis for property acquired on a liquidation is its
fair market value at the time of distribution. These long-established
rules led to the tax avoidance device known as the "collapsible cor-
poration" with which the Treasury Department has long been con-
cerned.! In 1950, Congress enacted a provision designed to deal
with this form of tax avoidance,2 the predecessor of section 341 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This article will examine the
device known as the" collapsible corporation," the manner in which
section 341 has been used to prevent the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain, and the problems flowing from this pro-
vision.
As will be seen, section 341 reaches a good many corporations
besides those at which it was aimed; and its application is not lim-
ited either to "temporary" corporations or to corporate liquida-
tions.3 Although section 341 has thus come to encompass a wide
it Boris L Bittker is Southmayd Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Jam£.>3 S.
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CoRPORA!l'IONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1966) (a. revised and enlo.t'ged edition of
Professor Bittker's 1959 treatise with the same title), published by the Federal Tax
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1Hearings OT/, :Revenue :Revi.sion Before the HOWIe Oommittee on Ways and Meall$,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1950).
2LR.C. § 117(m) (1939).
3 See Burge v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1958) :
The word "collapsible" considered apart from its context would be somev,ho.t mise
leading; but there can be no question, we think, llS to what Congress meant by 11
"collapsible corporation" as used in [section 341]. That term WllS used to describe 11
corporation which is made use of to give the appearance of a. long term investment to
what is in reality a mere venture or project in manufacture, production or construction
of property, with the view of making the gains from the venture or project taxable,
not as ordinary income, as they should be taxed, but llS long term capital gains. Becnuse
the basic type of transaction which gave rise to the legislation involved the use of tem·
porary corporations which were dissolved !lnd their proceeds distributed after ttl3: nvoid-
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range of corporations and transactions, it can be understood best
after the" classic" collapsible corporation is examined.
The collapsible corporation first attracted attention in the motion
picture industry. A producer, director, and leading actors would
organize a corporation for the production of a single motion pic-
ture. They would invest small amounts of cash and agree to work
for modest salaries, and the corporation would finance the produc-
tion with borrowed funds. When the motion picture was completed,
but before it was released for public exhibition, the corporation
would be liquidated. The stockholders would report the difference
between the cost of their stock and the value of their proportionate
shares in the completed film (established on the basis of previews)
as long-term capital gain under section 331(a)(1). For example, if
their investment in the stock was $100,000 and the value of the film
was $1,100,000, the shareholders' profit would be $1,000,000, on
which the capital gains tax would be $250,000. Under section 334(a),
the basis of the film in the hands of the shareholders would be
$1,100,000; and if the net rentals received thereafter equalled that
amount, they would have no further gain or loss, since the fair
market value of the film could be amortized against the rentals.4 In
effect, the exhibition profit, which would have been taxed as ordi-
nary income to the corporation had it not been liquidated (or to the
producers if they had operated in noncorporate form from the
outset) was converted into capital gain. Moreover, instead of two
taxes (a corporate tax on the exhibition income and an individual
tax at the capital gain rate on ultimate sale or liquidation of the
corporation), there would be only one.
The collapsible corporation was also used by builders and in-
vestors for the construction of homes in residential subdivisions.
A corporation would be created to construct the houses, but it
would be liquidated before the houses were sold. The stockholders
ance had been accomplished, the term "collapsible corporation" was employed to
describe the corporations used for this form of tmc avoidance j but the statute was
drawn in broad general terms to reach the abuse whieh had arisen, whatever form it
might take.
See also Braunstein v. Co='r, 374 U.S. 65 (1963). Both Burgo and Braunstein were
decided under section 117(m) of the 1939 Code. This interpretatien of seatian 117(m)
is the basis for the broad application of seation 341.
4 If the proceeds exceeded, or fell short of, the estimated fair market value, the sllare'
holders would have additional income or deduatible loss. In Pat O'Brien, 25 T.O. 370
(1955), acq., 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 4, it was held that income in excess of the 111m's basis
was taxable as ordinary income. But see Brodsky & King, Tax Savings TlirouUh Distribu.
tions in LiqUidation of Oorporate Oontracts, 27 TAXES 806 (1949) ; Farer, Corporato
Liquidations: Transmuting Ordinary Income Into OapitaZ Gains, 75 HARV. L. REV. 517
(1962).
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would report as long-term capit.al gain the difference between the
cost of their stock and the value of the completed houses. The
houses, which thus acquired a "stepped-up" basis under section
334:(a) equal to their fair market value at the time of distribution,
would then be sold, ordinarily wit.h no further gain or loss to be
accounted for. Here again, only one tax would be paid instead of
two, and that one would be computed at the capital gain rate.
NONSTATUTORY WEAPONS AGAINST THE COLLAPSIDLE CORPOIUTIO~
Even without specific statutory authority, the Treasury was not
entirely helpless in the face of the collapsible corporation. If the
promoters receive inadequate salaries, something could be said for
treating the stock of the corporation as additional compensation
taxable as ordinary income. Another possibility would be to treat
the whole transaction as an ineffective anticipatory assignment of
income, relying on the principle of Lucas v. Em'Z Ii that the federal
income tax cannot "be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised." Another argument open to
the Treasury was that the collapsible corporation lacks substance
and that the arrangement should be taxed as a joint venture of the
alleged stockholders.
So far, however, the Treasury has been unsuccessful in two
efforts to attack the collapsible corporation with these nonstatu-
tory weapons. One of these cases, Herbe1·t 'V. Riddell,a was not an
entirely fair test of the cogency of the nonstatutory arguments,
since the liquidation of the motion picture corporation there in-
volved was not prearranged, but resulted from a change in plans
after one film had been completed. But when the Tax Court came
to pass on a collapsible corporation whose liquidation was appar-
ently contemplated from its inception, it described Herberf v.
Riddell as "almost identical," and similarly held for the tn."\:-
payers.7 "While these initial set-backs would not have entirely fore-
closed the development of a nonstatutory weapon against the
collapsible corporation, the Treasury quite naturally shifted in
1950 to its newly enacted statutory weapon, and evidently gave up
5281 U.S. III (1930).
6103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Calif. 1952).
1Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); see also Gross v. Comm'r, 236 F.:!d 612, 618
(2d air. 1956), upholding the Tax Court's refusal to impute II salar,r to corporoto office1'3
who preferred to take their profits on a business ventnre in tho form of capital gains
distributions on their stock. For further discussion of possible nonstatutorj" weapons,
see Bittker &, Redlich, Corporate Liquidation.s and tIle Iflcome Tax, 5 T.\X L. R£\". 431,
439--48 (1950).
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on pre-1950 transactions after its losses in the Herbe1·t and O'Brien
cases.S
THE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 341
Although the details of section 341 are quite intricate, its basic
principle is simple: a shareholder who disposes of his stock in a
collapsible corporation in a transaction that would ordinarily pro-
duce long-term capital gain must instead report the gain as ordi-
nary income. As applied to the Hollywood collapsible corporation
described earlier, section 341(a) would compel the shareholders
to report their $1,000,000 gain on the corporation's complete liqui-
dation as ordinary income, a result which may well be more costly
than allowing the corporation to remain alive to realize the in-
come from the film with a view to ultimate sale or liquidation of
the corporation. If section 341 (a) were applicable only to com-
plete liquidations, however, the shareholders would be able to
escape by means of one of the following devices:
1. A corporate distribution of the property without a surrender of stocIe,
since under section 301(c)(3)(A) the excess of the value of the property
over the shareholders' basis for their stock would ordinarily be taxed as
long-term capital gain if the distribution occurred before the corporation
had realized any earnings and profits.
2. A sale or exchange of the stock.9
3. A partial liquidation of the corporation, if the criteria of section 346
could be satisfied.
In recognition of the fact that the above arrangements might be
used as a substitute for a complete liquidation, section 341(a)
provides that gain realized by a shareholder ill any of these ways
shall, to the extent that it would otherwise be long-term capital
gain, be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of a non-
capital asset.IO
8 But see Jacobs v. Co='r, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
9 The new shareholders WOuld, of course, be concerned about the corporation's low
basis for its assets, but they could liquidate the corporation without tax cost sinco
the value of the liquidating distribution would presumably be equal to tho prico paid
for the stock. The property would thereupon take on a new basis equal to its "lIlue,
either under section 334(11.), or, if the buyer was a corporation, under section 334(b) (2).
10 There is a curious omission from this pattern: a distribution in redemption of
stock that is treated as long-term capital gain under section 302(a). The omission, wbich
probably stems from carrying forward the pre-1954 reference to t I partilll liquidlltions"
without noting that this term in the 1954 Code no longer includes redemptions, may be
neutralized by the fact that most distributions by collapsible corporations will rofleet
a t t corporate contraction" so as to constitute partial liquidlltiellS, which aro co"erecl
by section 341(11.) (2). In an effort to bring distributions b~' collapsiblo corporations
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Section 341(a) is applicable only if the shareholder's gain would
otherwise be long-term capital gain.l1 The omission of short-term
capital gain from section 341(a) is surprising, since it permits the
collapsible corporation to retain its old advantages for the share-
holder who has capital losses that can be offset against any short-
term capital gain realized on the liquidation or sale.I :! Section 341
(a) is also inapplicable to losses. Finally, section 341(a) applies to
gain that otherwise "would be considered" as long-term capital
gain, but it does not of its own force make gain taxable, with the re-
sult that it will have no effect upon a tax-free exchange of stock
in a collapsible corporation (e.g., under section 351 or section 1036).
Aside from the basic rules of section 341(a), the statute consists
of (a) a definition of the term "collapsible corporation"; (b) n
statutory presumption in aid of the definition; and (c) three sets
of limitations that moderate the rules of section 341(a) in certain
circumstances. These aspects of section 341 will be examined in the
remaining sections of this article.13 Two other disadvantages of
within section 341 (a) (2), the government may have to construe the term "partial
liquidation" expansi.ely, contrary to its usual position.
It is also possible that a section 302(a) redemption could be brought within section
341 (a) (1), as a "sale or exchange" of stock, though this theory would he open to
the objection that the regulations require an "actual" sale or exchange. Reg. Se~_
1.341-1. Moreover, it would render the inclusion of partial liquidations in section 341
(a) (2) redundant, since if a section 302(a) redemption is covered b.r section 341(a) (1),
so would be a section 346 redemption. Note, however, that the term "l'31e or exclJange"
is used in section 341(c) to include partial and complete liquidations-or at 1e:mt 60
the regulations assume. Reg. See. 1.341-3(a). Sec also section 341(£) (1).
Prior to 1954, the statute did not explicitly reach distributions that were not accom-
panied by a surrender of st<lck, but they were held subject to the statute anyway in
Pomponio v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1961).
11 Thns, if a corporate distribution of money or property would be treated as dindend
income to its shareholders under section 301, section 341 would not appl)-. Similarly, if
the stock is not a capital asset because the sharcholder holds it as "denler property,"
ordinary gain would result on its sale without resort to the provisions of section 341(a).
The special earnings and profits rule of section 31~(j) bears speeinl mention in this
context. Prior to the enactment of section 341 in 1950, a corporation having no earnings
and profits could distribute the "excess" mortgage proceeds from government guaran-
teed loans and its shareholders would receive return of capitnl, and hence capital gain,
treatment thereon. From 1950 through 1954, however, these transactions were subject to
the collapsible corporation provisions of section 117(m) of the 1939 Code (the predeces-
sor of section 341). But for years covered by the 1954: C<lde, such distributions are taxablo
as dividend income to the shareholders, since earnings and profits are specificall:r created
for this purpose by section 312(j), thus eliminating this type of trans.1ction from the
coverage of section 341. Note that "con.entional" mortgage bailouts are still subject
to section 341, however, since section 312(j) applies only to federnlly insured mortgages.
12 Note also that section 333 apparently could be used in this situation since the sbare-
holders would not be subject to section 341 treatment because of the short·term holding
period of their stock.
13 For an exhaustive examination of section 341 as amended in 1958, but prior to the
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collapsible corporation status are: (a) section 337 (nonrecognition
of corporate gain or loss on certain sales in conjunction with a
complete liquidation) is ordinarily inapplicable to collapsible cor·
porations; and, (b) section 333 (nonrecognition of shareholder
gain on elective one month liquidations) is also ordinarily inappli-
cable to collapsible corporations.14
As noted earlier, the penalty of section 341 (ordinary gain treat-
ment to shareholders of a collapsible corporation) may be more
severe than if the parties had realized the entire gain at the cor-
porate level and then liquidated their corporation at a capital gain.
This results from the fact that the top bracket for individuals is
70 per cent (1966 rates), while the total effective rate if the profit
is taxed once at the corporate level (as ordinary gain) and then
at the shareholder level (as capital gain) would not exceed 61
per cent. This disparity may be reduced if the shareholder's gain
on a sale of the stock of a collapsible corporation is reported on
the installment basis under section 453, or if the averaging relief
enactment of section 341 (f) in 1964, see Axelrad, Oollapsible Corporations allll Oollap'
sible Partnersllips, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAX INST. 269.
Other post-1958 discussions are: Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: Tll(1
Oorporafe Election and Oollapsible ..d.mendment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1146 (1958);
Donaldson, Oollapsible Oorporations, 36 TA..'{ES 777 (1958); Odell, Oollapsible Oorpora.
tions-Some "Softspots" in Section 341, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 645 (1964); Pollotior,
Sharellolder Intent and Oongressional Purpose in the Oollapsible Oorporation Morass,
20 TAX L. REV. 699 (1965); Note, Oollapsible Oorporations-..d.pplication to Real EstaCe
Transactions, 15 TAX L. REV. 121 (1959).
Earlier discussions are: Axelrad & Kostas, ..d. Re·Examination Of Oollapsible Oor.
porations "With a View To" Ooexisting with Seetion 341, U. SO. CAL. 1956 TAX INST.
549; Boland, Practical Problems of the Oollapsible Oorporation, PROOEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL 'l'AXATION 537 (1952); Do.
Wind & Anthoine, Oollapsible Oorporations, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 475 (1956); Frooman,
Oollapsible Oorporations, PROOEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVl:RSITY ELEVENTU ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 407 (1953); MacLean, Oollapsible Oorporations-Tho
Statute and Regulations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1953); Weyher & Bolton, Oollapsible Oor·
porations as ..d.ffected by tlle 1954 Oode-Inventory and Unrealized Receivables, PROOEED.
INGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
657 (1955).
See also Dauber, Use of Reorganization Techniques to '&voicl Collapsiblo TroatmtJ1lt,
49 A.B.A.J. 1214 (1963).
14 There are, however, certain differences in the treatment of liquidating collapsible
corporations under section 337 and section 333. If a corporation is "collapsiblo" within
the meaning of section 341(b), its assets cannot be sold tnx-free under section 337,
but this fact in turn cures its collapsible status by compelling realization of gain at the
corporate level; see Rev. Rul. 63-125, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 146 (and this result obtllin!l
even though its shareholders are protected from ordinary gain trcntment by one of tho
exceptions of section 341(d». In the case of section 333 liquiclntions, on the othor hand,
if the shareholders are protected from collapsible treatment by section 341 (d), section
333 can be uscd, notwithstanding the collapsible character of the corporatiol1; Rev. Rul.
63-114, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 74. See note 40 infra.
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of section 1301 applies. It bears noting, however, that there is no
doctrine of "partial collapsibility," permitting the sharcholdl!r't\
gain under seciton 341 to be fragmented between capital gain and
ordinary income depending on the "mix" of collapsible aud non-
collapsible assets involved; this all-or-nothing aspect of section 341
makes it difficult to settle close cases with the Service.
THE DEFINITION OF "COLLAPSIDLE CORPORATIO::\,"
The term "collapsible corporation" is defined by section 341(b)
to mean a corporation that is formed or availed of:
1. Principally for the" production" of property (or for certain other ac-
tivities to be discussed below) ;
2. With a view to (a) a sale, liquidation, or distribution before it has
realized a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the prop-
erty, and (b) a realization by the shareholders of the gain attributable to the
property.
Ifwe take the extreme case of a corporation that is organized solely
to produce one motion picture and that, by agreement among the
shareholders at the time of its creation, is to be liquidated as soon
as the :film is completed and before any income is received by the
corporation, the applicability of section 341 (b) is indisputable.
Moreover, the use of an existing corporation for these purposes
will not escape section 341(b), since it is applicable whether the
corporation is "formed" or "availed of" for the specified pur-
pose. Finally, although the collapsible corporation provisions are
aimed primarily at attempts to convert untaxed corporate ordinary
income into shareholder level capital gain, the Supreme Court has
held that there is no implied exception in section 341 for profits
that would have been taxed as capital gain if the corporate assets
had been sold by the shareholders as individuals.IG Accordingly,
the operation of section 341 may serve to convert what would
otherwise be capital gain into ordinary income solely because of
the use of a corporation, a result which was largely responsible
for the adoption in 1958 of the "amnesty" of section 341(e).
15 Braunstein v. Co='r, 374 U.S. 65 (1963), rejecting the restrictive theot'j· of Ive)"
v. United States, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 19(1). See also Baile)' v. United Slates, 300
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1966), refusing to find an implied e.xception in section 341 for
shareholders whose intent had been to liquidate the corporation in a tax·free liquidation
under the 1939 C-ode version of section 333. (The liquidation failed to qualify for such
nonrecognition, however, because of 3. failure to file a proper election). Prior to 1954,
the "one-month" liquidation rules of section 112(b)(7) (1939) did not prohibit their
use by a collapsible corporation; hence the ta:qlayer's argument in Bailey that the
prohibited view did not exist because of the intent to effect 1I. t..u·free liquidation had
considerable merit. See also Rev. Rul. 56-160, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 633.
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The "collapsible corporation" definition (which should be exam-
ined with a lively appreciation of the fact that the term is not con-
fined to such classic collapsible patterns as the use of temporary
corporations in the motion picture or construction industries)
contains these elements:
1. F01"med 01" availed of. Because section 341 reaches corpora-
tions that are either "formed" or "availed of" for the proscribed
purposes, it is not confined to a corporation that is specially created
for the purpose or that is dissolved as soon as the purpose has
been achieved.16 Temporary corporations may be especially vul-
nerable, but a long life does not insure immunity.
2. Principally for the manufacture, construction or production of
property (to any extent). Early debate on this aspect of the defini-
tion in section 341 (b) centered on whether the word" prinoipally"
modified the language "manufacture, construction or production,"
or whether it referred only to the collapsible "view" test; if tho
latter was the correct interpretation, the statute would have been
appreciably narrowed in scope. The regulations adopted tho
former construction from the outset, and courts soon agreed.17
The result of these cases is that the corporation need only be
formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, etc. of prop-
erty, a condition present in the case of most if not all ordinary
business corporations, and the forbidden "view" need not be the
principal reason for formation or use of the corporation.
Similarly, the definition of "manufacture, construction or pro-
duction" has received an expansive interpretation by courts and
the Service. This definition has two distinct elements: (1) whether
the questioned activity itself constitutes "production"; and (2)
the duration of the activity (since its duration has significance in
connection with the "view" requirement, as well as in applying
the three year rule of section 341(d) (3)). The earlier opinions and
rulings on this question suggested that practically any corporate
activity that is materially related to a property creating transac-
tion would satisfy the statutory test,18 but the pendulum may be
16 Reg. See. 1.341-2 (a) ; Glickman v. Co='r, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Gir. 1958); Burge v.
Co='r, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
11 Reg. See. 1.341-2(a)(2) ; Mintz v. Co='r, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960); Burge v.
Co='r, supra note 16; Weil v. Co='r, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
18 E.g.: Farber v. Co='r, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963) (filing of applications for
zoning permits and mortgage guarantees, payment of fees, and payments for utility
and water connections held construction); Glickman v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1958) (construction period extended beyond issuance of final certificate of occuplUloy,
and included landscaping and obtaining of FHA inspector's final approval); Stornor v.
Co='r, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959) (hiring mortgage broker lUId architect, application for
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swinging back to a limited extent. Thus, it has been held that the
term "construction" does not include: minor alterations and cor-
rections of an existing structure that did not change its character
or increase its fair market value; the drilling of dry holes and
unsuccessful exploration activities; or various preliminary activ-
ities by a real estate construction corporation.ll1 If the corporation
goes beyond distinctly preliminary activities or mere maintenance
of existing assets, however, it may be engaged in "construction";
it should not be forgotten that to do so "to any extent" suffices
under section 341(b) (2) (A) . .Although the cases and rulings have
not said so explicitly, it may be that the distinction bctween de-
ductible expenses and capital outlays that has developed under
section 162 and section 263 will afford a useful analogy.
It would seem that any type of property which a corporation is
capable of producing will meet the requirements of the statutory
definition. .Although the vast majority of transactions which run
afoul of section 341 involve the construction or production of
tangible property (buildings, motion pictures, etc.), thc creation of
such intangibles as good will, secret formulas, industrial lmow-
how, and the like, even by a service business, may also be within
the reach of the section, although as yet there seem to bc no re-
ported cases in point.
3. Purchase of "section 341 assets." Even if the corporation
does not engage in the "manufacture, construction, or production
of property," it may fall within section 341 by engaging in the
"purchase" of "section 341 assets," provided this is done with
a "view" to a sale, liquidation, or distribution before it has
realized a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived
from such property. This portion of the definition was originnlly
enacted in 1951 and expanded in 1954. It is primarily aimed at the
use of collapsible corporations to convert the profit on inventory
property and stock in trade into capital gain:
The procedure used was to transfer a commodity to a new or dormant cor-
poration, the stock of which is then sold to the prospective purchaser of the
commodity who would thereupon liquidate the corporation. In this manner
FHA mortgage insurance, and negotiation of sales contract held construction) i Abbott
v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 795 (1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3rd Cir. 19G8) (corporation owning
unimproved land held to have engaged in construction by contracting to install streets,
obtaining FHA. mortgage commitment, and depositing funds in escrow to insuro tbat
improvements would be installed); Rev. Rul. 56-137, 19G6-1 CUll. BULL. 178 (rezoning
of land from residential to commercial use held construction).
19 Morris Cohen v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 886 (1963); V. W. McPherson, ~1 COO T.e.
:MEY. DEC. 583 (1962); Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 ClP..!. BlJLL. 131; Rev. Rul. 63-114,
1963-1 Cror. BULL. 74.
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the accretion in the value of the commodity, which in most of the actual
cases was whiskey, would be converted into a gain realized on the sale of
stock in a corporation, thus opening the possibility that it would be taxed
as a long-term capital gain.20
If the transaction described by this committee report was suffi-
ciently blatant, the formation of the corporation and sale of its
stock might be treated as a single transaction by which the tax-
payer sold the property itself in the ordinary course of business,
as in Jacobs v. Commissioner; 21 or the repeated use of the device
might lead to the conclusion that the corporate stock was held for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, which would
make the capital gain provisions inapplicable.22 It was evidently
thought, however, that a statutory tool would be prefemble to the
"single transaction" approach of the Jacobs case.23 Under section
341 as amended, every corporation holding appreciated inventory
or stock in trade would be a potential target for section 341, and
its fate would depend on whether the elusive "view" was present;
but the regulations cut down the scope of the statute by conferring
immunity on the corporation if its inventory property-more pre-
cisely, the property described in section 341(b)(3) (A) and (B)-
is normal in amount and if it has a substantial prior business
history involving the use of such property.24
20 H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1951).
21224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
22 For a decision adopting this approach in an extreme case, see Herman Katz, 19
CCH T.C. MEM. DEC. 1035 (1960).
For other applications of the Jacobs approach, see Margolis v. Comm'r, 337 F.2d
1001 (9th Cir. 1964); Willett v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1960); Thomas F.
Abbott Jr., 23 CCH T.C. ~EM. DEC. 445 (1964).
23 The languagc employed by section 341 (b) to reach the device describe<l in the text
is somewhat awkward; it might be argued that the corporation was not forme<l or
availed of for the purchase of stock in trade, inventory property, or property held for
sale to customers-as required by section 341(b)(3)(A) and (B)-since the wlliskoy
in question was not to be sold by the corporation. The regulations, in accord with till)
obvious legislative intent, state that the status of the property is to be determine(l with·
out regard to the collapsibility of the corporation, i.e., if tile whiskey would bo inventory
in the hands of a "normal" corporation, it wiII lmvo the same status in the hands ef
the collapsible corporation.
For an application of section 341(b) (3) to a one shot purchase an(l sale of a single
parcel of real estate, see Guy A. Van Heusden, 44 T.C. 491 (1965), atT'cl, 66·2 U.S.T.O.
11 9751 (5th Cir. 1966).
On the troubleseme question of "dual purpose" property, held for either investment
or sale, see Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
24 Reg. Sec. 1.341-5(c) (1); see also Rev. Rul. 56-244, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 176, where
inventory, though appreciated in value, was normal in amount for volume of salos and
not in excess of average inventory over the preceding several ;rears. The corporation was
held not to be collapsible in that instance.
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The 1951 amendment reached inventory property, stock in trade,
and property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business-the categories now found in section
341(b) (3) (A) and (B). In 1954, section 341 was expanded, to reach
a purchase of "unrealized receivables or fees" and certain prop-
erty described in section 1231(b), by the addition of section 341(b)
(3)(C) and (D). At the same time, the generic label "section 341
assets" was created for the property reached by both the 1951
and the 1954 legislation.
Although the Senate Report on the 1954 Code docs not explain
the extension of section 341 to cover a purchase of CCunrealized
receivables or fees," 25 presumably Congress sought thereby to
prevent an individual on the cash basis of accounting from trans-
ferring uncollected claims for services or goods to a corporation in
order to sell the stock at the capital gains rate, since in the absence
of a corporation the taxpayer would have to report the collections
as ordinary income.
The 1954 inclusion of section 1231(b) property in the category
of CCsection 341 assets" is less clear, since capital gain can ordi-
narily be realized on the sale of such property without resort to
the use of a collapsible corporation. The change may have been
intended to prevent dealers in apartment houses or other I·ental
property from converting ordinary income into capital gain
through the use of a separate corporation for each parcel of prop-
erty. This device might have been defeated without amending sec-
tion 341, by treating the corporate stock as held for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of business and hence, under section
1221(1), as a non-capital asset. The remedy that was adopted by
Congress, however, was more drastic; the result of treating section
1231(b) property as "section 341 assets" is that the typical real
estate holding corporation, formed to purchase an apartment house
or other rental property, may be collapsible if the requisite view
is present, even though the shareholders are investors rather than
dealers and would have been entitled to report their profit on the
building as capital gain under section 1231 in the absence of a cor-
25 Despite the definition of "unrealized reccimbles or fees" in section 341(b)(4)-
or perhaps because of it-the term. is most ambiguous, especially as concerns tho status
of rights under long term contracts. For some of the difficulties, see DeWind &; Antboine,
supra note 13, at 496-502. Note also that the "unrealized reeeh·ables or fees" must
have been "purchased" by the corporation. This implies the acquisition of 11 cb020 in
action from a third party, but it is essential to the statutot')· purpose to include untascd
accounts receivable resulting from the corporation '8 sales of its own merchnndise or
performance of services. But ct. Reg. See. 1.341-3(b) (accrued rents not n. section ::41
asset).
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poration. The collapsible corporation provisions have thus come
full circle: designed to prevent the transmutation of ordinary in-
come into capital gain, they may now convert capital gain into
ordinary income. In recognition of this possibility, Congress in
1958 enacted section 341(e) to provide an escape from collapsibility
in cases, roughly speaking, where the taxpayers would have en-
joyed capital gains had they not used the corporate form. This
amendment is discussed in the text infra following note 48.
Another unexplained 1954 change is that the term "section 341
assets" embraces only property held for a period of less than 3
years. Because of this limitation, if a commodity is held by tho
corporation for 3 years or more (including the holding period of
certain predecessors) after manufacture, construction, production,
or purchase has been completed, the shareholders may be able to
sell their stock or liquidate the corporation without running afoul
of section 341(a). This escape is limited, however, by the possibility
that a transfer of the property to a corporation for the sole pur-
pose of obtaining capital gain on the sale or liquidation could be
attacked as a sham without resort to section 341, as in the Jacobs
case. Or, if the"aging" process enhanced the value of the prop-
erty, it might constitute the "manufacture, construction, or pro-
duction" of property, and thus prevent the running of the 3-year
period.
4. With a "view" (to" collapse"). Since many, if not most,
ordinary business corporations are formed or availed of principally
for the production or purchase of property (especially since these
terms are broadly defined by section 341), the major issue in a
section 341 (b) case is usually the existence of the requisite "view"
on the part of the shareholders to effect a sale, liquidation, or dis-
tribution before the corporation has realized a substantial part of
the income to be derived from its property. The classic collapsible
corporation was one whose shareholders planned at the very outset
to liquidate it before corporate income was realized. The regula-
tions, however, say that section 341(b) is satisfied if a sale,
liquidation, or distribution before the corporation has realized a
substantial part of the gain from the property' 'was contemplated,
unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility." 20
This seems to imply that the requisite view exists whenever the
controlling shareholders can reasonably foresee that they may de-
cide to sell their stock or liquidate the corporation, if the price is
"right," before it substantially realizes the income from its
26 Reg. Sec. 1.341-2 (a) (2).
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collapsible property. If SO, the "recognized possibility" test is
almost all-embracing, and the courts may be unwilling to go this
far, unless the shareholders are experienced professionals in the
business at hand.27
The regulations go on to state that the persons whose "view" is
crucial are those who are in a position to determine the policies
of the corporation, whether by reason of majority stock ownership
or "otherwise." This approach may be hard on innocent minority
shareholders, but without such a rule section 341 could be too
easily avoided by keeping one shareholder in the dark. Finally,
the regulations provide that the collapsible view must exist at some
time during construction, production, or purchase of the collapsible
property. Some courts have felt that the regulations are overly
generous in this respect, asserting that the view need only be helcl
when the corporation is "availed of" for the collapsible purpose
even if production of the property has been completed by then;
other decisions, however, have questioned or rejected such a broad
interpretation.28 In. any event, determination of the time when the
view arose will of necessity be difficult, involving as it does a highly
subjective issue of intent, and the chronological breadth of the
term "production" makes it difficult to establish that a tainted
view, if it existed, did not arise until after production was com-
pleted.
It must be concluded, therefore, that the regulations bring within
section 341 any corporation that is formed or availed of for the
production or purchase of property if the persons in control recog-
nize (before production is completed) the possibility of selling or
liquidating the corporation at a profit before it has realized a sub-
stantial part of the income from its property (absent compelling
facts to the contrary). Moreover, the natural tendency of courts
and administrators to assume that what actually did happen was
intended is evident in this area, so that self-serving declarations
2'1 For a willingness to infer the tainted view in cnses involving real estate operators,
see Braunstein v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962); Payne v. Comm'r, 26B F.2d
617 (5th Cir. 1959); August v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 19(9); Carl B. :Rechner,
30 T.C. 186 (1958); Nordberg, Col14psUiw CorporatiolUl and tlu! "l"il.:lD," 40 TAXES
372 (1962).
28Reg. Sec. 341-2(a)(3). Decisions holding or implying that the regulation is too
restrictive: Spangler v. Comm'r, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960); Sidney v. Comm'r, 273
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960); Glickman v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 195B); Burgo v.
Comm'r, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). For a. view more in accord with tho regulation,
see Braunstein v. Comm'r, supra Dote 27; Jacobson v. Comm'r, 281 F.2d 703 (3rd Oir.
1960); Payne v. Comm'r, supra Dote 27; see also Farber '". C"mm'r, 312 F.2d 720
(2d Cir. 1965); Stanley Stahl, 25 CCR T.C. MEM. DEC. 505 (1966).
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about the shareholders' state of mind are likely to be less per-
suasive than the actual results. This emphasis on objective con-
siderations is evident in section 1.341-5 (b) of the regulations,
which states that a corporation "ordinarily" will be considered
collapsible if (a) gain attributable to property produced or pur-
chased by the corporation is realized by the shareholder on a sale
of his stock or non-dividend distribution; (b) the production or
purchase of the property was a substantial corporate activity; and
(c) the corporation has not realized a substantial part of the tax-
able income to be derived from such property.
The regulations do mention one avenue of escape: if the decision
to sell, liquidate, or distribute is "attributable solely to circum-
stances which arose after the production or purchase . . . other
than circumstances which could reasonably be anticipated at the
time of production or purchase." Among the post-production mo-
tives that have been held to qualify are: illness of an active share-
holder; unexpected changes in the law; dissension among the share-
holders, especially if a minority interest is bought out; unexpected
changes in the value of the property; and a shareholder's sudden
need for funds to enter or expand another business.2lJ This excep-
tion is less useful than might appear, however, because of the
difficulty of proving that the cause of sale could not have been
initially anticipated, as well as because the production process may
extend well beyond normal concepts of "completion." 30
5. OorporaJe realization of substantial part of taxable income
from the property. A corporation can escape the taint of collapsi-
bility under section 341 (b) (1) (A) by realizing a "substantial"
part of the taxable income to be derived from each of its produced
or purchased properties. Where such property consists of fungible
units in an integrated project (e.g., inventory assets of a singlo
business, separate installments of a television or motion picture
29 Reg. See. 1.341-2(a) (3). See Charles J. Rile~', 35 T.e. 848 (1961) (illncss);
Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961) (same); Reg. Sec. 1.341-5 (d) Ex. 3
(same); Rev. Rut 57-575, 1957-2 CUl!. BULL. 236 (snle of property to United Statcs
under statute whose enactment was not :mticipated); Comm'r v. Lowery, 33G
F.2d 680 (3d Cit 1964) (buyout of minority shareholder who could not make additional
investment); see also Goodwin v. United States, 320 F.2d 356 (Ct. CI. 1963); and
Co='r v. Solow, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964), for similar decisions; Jacobson v.
Co='r, 281 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir. 1960), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65 (1963) (change in property's
value); Southwest Properties, Inc., 38 T.C. 97 (1962) (same); Morris Cohen, 39 T.O.
886 (1963) (same; but see Braunstein v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d 9~19 (2d Cir. 1962), alf'd,
374 U.S. 65 (1963) (change in value not controlling); Jack Saltzman, 22 COlI T.O.
MEM. DEC. 336 (1963) (need for funds); Stanley Stahl, supra note 28 (sale compelled
by economic and business factors beyond taxpayer's control).
30 See Carl Rechner, 30 T.C. 186 (1958); Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.e. 844 (1962).
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series, or individual units in a housing project), the determination
of substantial realization is to be made by treating the aggregate
of these properties as a single unit. Thus, if a corporation con-
structs two office buildings, the sale of one building will not protect
it from collapsible treatment caused by the second building; on the
other hand, if it is engaged in constructing a housing project, the
entire project would constitute a "single property" for substantial
realization purposes.31
Apparently the "taxable income to be derived from the prop-
erty" means the taxable income that would be realized if the prop-
erty were sold at the time the shareholder's gain arises.::!:! This test
seems appropriate in the case of property held only for sale (e.g.,
inventory or residential home units); but where rental property
is involved, some courts require an estimate of the projected net
rental income to be realized over the economic life of the property,
a yardstick which is considerably more difficult to apply.33 In addi-
tion, the fact that the property has produced no net income or is
losing money has not precluded a :finding of collapsibility where
the prohibited view was present.3 -1 In any event, income which has
been realized must be attributable to the collapsible property in
order to count towards the substantial realization test.
Once the estimated potential taxable income from the property
is determined, the question then arises as to what percentage
thereof will be "substantial." Although a determination of this
amount would at best represent an ad hoc judgment, the issue is
complicated by a question of statutory interpretation: is collapsi-
bility avoided if a "substantial" part of the potential is realized,
or must enough be realized so that the unrealized part is 'not sub-
stantiaH To illustrate: if 30 per cent of the total is "substantial,"
must more than 70 per cent be realized, or 'will 30 per cent suffice ¥
In CO'lmnissioner v. Kelly,3,;) the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that a realization of about one-third of the potential
31 Reg. Sec. 1.341-2(a) (4) and Reg. Sec. 1.3U·5(d) Ess. 2, 3 and 4; but ~/. section
SH(d) (2) and Reg. Sec. 1.341-4 (c) (3) (reeomputation under 70-30 per cent rule).
32 See Corom'r v. Kelly, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961); Levenson v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957). See Ryan. WIlat is Substantial Part 01 tllo Tazablc
Income, 16:r. TAXATION 246 (1961).
33 Mintz v. Corom'r. 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960); Sidney v. ~mm 'r, 273 F.2d 9l!S
(2d Cir. 1960); Payne v. C<Jrom'r. 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959). Tho Mintz and SidnClJ
cases also held that premiums received from a. lender with which an FHA mortgage
was placed were not part of the net income tI to be derived from such propert)·. JJ
34 Short v. Comm'r, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962); Spangler v. ~mUl'r, :178 F.2d
665 (4th Oir. 1960).
;)5293 F.2d 904 (5th Oir. 1961).
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taxable income was sufficient, a result that seriously impairs the
effectiveness of section 341 but finds support in the statutory lan-
guage. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by contrast,
has upheld the Service's insistence that the corporation is collap-
sible if there is a substantial amount of unrealized income.no
6. Realization by shareholders of gain attributable to the prop-
erty. This last element of the collapsible definition has generated
relatively few problems, since, if the other elements are present,
it will be satisfied almost automatically if the collapsible property
has appreciated in value at the time of collapse.37 Problems in
determining whether the shareholder's gain is "attributable to
such property" are discussed in the text infra at note 42, in con-
nection with the 70 per cent exception of section 341(d)(2).
7. Additional considerations. To safeguard its statutory pur-
pose, section 341 provides that a corporation "shall be deemed to
have manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased prop-
erty" if any of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) If the corporation engages in manufacture, construction, or produc-
tion of property" to any extent. " By virtue of this provision, the corpora-
tion need not have originated or completed the process of manufacture,
construction, or production; any contribution to the process is sufficient.
(b) If the corporation holds property having a basis determined by
reference to the cost of such property in the hands of a person who manu-
factured, constructed, produced, or purchased it. This provision reaches
such devices as the transfer of manufactured property or "section 341
assets" to a corporation by a tax-free exchange under section 351, or the
use of a second corporation into which a collapsible corporation is merged.
36 Abbott v. Corom'r, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Corom'r v. Zongkor, 334
F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1964) (amount realized, not the amount unrealized, is controlling; tho
Tax Court had intimated that realization of 24 per cent of potential would suffico); Raft
v. Corom'r, 294 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1961) (17 per cent not" substantial"; lator distribu-
tions in liquidation subjected to section 341 even though 51 par cent had been roalizod
by then).
The regulations, section 1.341·5 (c) (2), are inconclusive on this point, merely
stating that a corporation ordinarily will not be deemed collapsible if its unrealized
income is not substantial in amount. It is understood that the Service will rulo favorably
on the status of collapsibility if 85 per cent of the income from collapsible property
has been realized. See also Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 321 (Abbott approaclt).
In theory, the amount actually realized is irrelevant, and tho amount which tho sharo-
holders intended the corporation to realize is controlling. But this would mako tho
corporation collapsible even if all the income had in fact been realizec] by it, provided
the shareholders had earlier entertained the "view" that the income should not bo
realized by the corporation. The regulations, perhaps treating the events as they oceur
as the best evidence of what was intended, clearly imply that actual-rather tltnn
intended-realization is controlling. Reg. Sec. 1.341·2(a) (4) and Reg. See. 1.341·5 (c) (2).
But 8e6 Payne v. Comm'r, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
37 See, for example, Payne v. Comm'r, supra note 36 (shareholder's viow to collllpso
and realization of gain attributable to collapsible property go hand in hand).
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The statute does not state whether the successor corporation inherits not
only the collapsible property, but also the transferor's ccview.))
(c) If the corporation holds property having a basis determined by ref-
erence to the cost of property manufactured, constructed, produced, or pur-
chased by it. This provision is designed to prevent an escape from section
341 by a plan under which the corporation would manufacture property
and transfer it in a tax-free exchange (e.g., under section 1031), following
which the shareholders would liquidate the corporation or sell their stock
before the corporation had realized income from the newly acquired
property.
A further buttress to section 341 is the inelusion of holding com-
panies in the term "collapsible corporation." If a corporation is
employed to hold the stock of a manufacturing corporation, the
parent corporation will be a "collapsible corporation" by virtue
of section 341(b)(1) if it is formed or availed of with a "view"
to a sale, liquidation, or distribution before the manufacturing
corporation has realized a substantial part of the taxable income
from the property. In Revenue Ruling 56-50 38 it was held that the
holding company becomes noncollapsible (so as to protect its
shareholders) if it sells the stock of the subsidiary and is taxed
under section 341(a) on its gain, notwithstanding some difficulty
in bringing this result within the literal terms of the statute.
THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF COLLAPsmILITY: SEOTION 341(0)
In 1954, section 341 was amended to add a rebuttable presump-
tion of collapsibility if the fair market value of the corporation's
"section 341 assets" is (a) 50 per cent or more of the fair market
value of its total assets and (b) 120 per cent or more of the ad-
justed basis of such "section 341 assets." The theory of the re-
buttable presumption is that if the "section 341 assets" are sub-
stantial in amount and have risen significantly in value above their
basis, it is reasonable to place the burden of disproving collapsi-
bility on the taxpayer.39 In order to prevent manipulation, section
381956-1 CuM. BULL. 174. See gener:l1ly, Del Cotto, TIle Holding Company 48 4 Col-
lapsible Corporation Under Section 841 Of TIle Internalllcr:enuc Coilc, 15 BUFFALO L.
REV. 524 (1966).
39 Even without the presumption of section 314(c), the taxpayer has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of correctness that aeeompll.llies tho CommiESioner's action
is assessing a deficieney. What weight, if any, section 341(c) adds to this nonstatutor)'
presumption is doubtful. Perhaps it is only II a. handkerchief thrown over something
eovered by a blanket," as Randolph Paul said of an lI.JllI.10g0UB statutory presumption in
the federal estate tax law. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIF'J1 T.hXA'I'ION 92 (1946 Supp.).
But note that application of the presumption in seetion 3U(\!) will probably llarv6
to poison the atmosphere of the taxpayer's case, and, to this extent, it may OCCUP)' a
signtiic.ant role. See, e.g., Max Tobias, 40 T.O. 84 (1963).
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341 (c) (2) provides that cash, stock, and certain securities are to
be disregarded in determining the corporation's "total assets";
otherwise, the shareholders of a corporation whose "section 341
assets" have appreciated substantially in value might attempt to
avoid the statutory presumption by contributing liquid assets to
the corporation's capital to dilute the "section 341 assets" to less
than 50 per cent of the total assets. Perhaps the "business pur-
pose" doctrine could be used by the Commissioner as an alternative
weapon against an attempt to drown the corporation's "section
341 assets" in a sea of other assets by contributions to capital
having no nontax purpose.
In applying the presumption of section 341(c), the appreciation
in "section 341 assets' , is measured against their basis, not
against the shareholders' investment. Thus, if the shareholders
invest $15,000 in a corporation, and it constructs "section 341
assets" at a cost of $100,000 (represented by $15,000 of equity
investment and $85,000 of borrowed funds), the presumption of
section 341(c) will not be applicable if the assets increase in value
to only $115,000 (this being less than 120 per cent of their basis),
even though the appreciation ($15,000) represents a profit of 100
per cent on the shareholders' investment. If the assets increased
in value to $120,000, however, section 341(c) would become appli-
cable; and this would be true even if the shareholders had financed
the entire cost of construction ($100,000) with their own funds
and had enjoyed a gain of only 20 per cent on their investment.
Since the presumption of section 341 (c) is rebuttable, it is open
to the taxpayer to establish that the corporation is not "collap-
sible" because it was not formed or availed of principally for the
purposes set out in section 341 (b) or because the requisite "view"
did not exist. Section 341(c) also provides that its inapplicability
shall not give rise to a presumption that the corporation is not a
collapsible corporation.
THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF SEm'ION 341(d)
Even though the corporation is "collapsible" under the fore-
going principles, section 341(d) makes the punitive rules of sec-
tion 341 inapplicable to a particular shareholder 40 if any of the
following three conditions are satisfied:
40 Section 341(d) provides relief for the shareholder only j tho eorporation romains
collapsible as respects such provisions as seetion 337 (c) (1) (nonapplicability of sec·
tion 337). Rev. Rul. 63-125, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 146. On the other hand, section 333
call be used by shareholders who are protected from collapfliblo trcntmont bJ' sectloll
341(d). Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 74.
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1. Not 1n01·e than 5 pet· cent of stocle. The shareholder is not sub-
ject to section 341 unless he owns (a) more than 5 per cent in value
of the outstanding stock, or (b) stock that is attributed to another
shareholder who owns more than 5 per cent of the stock. The
ownership of stock is to be determined under a set of constructive
ownership rules,41 and the specified amount of stock will be fatal
if owned when the manufacture, construction, or production of
property is begun, when "section 341 assets" are purchased, or at
any time thereafter.
2. Not more than 70 per cent of gain attributable to collapsible
property. Section 341(d)(2) insulates a shar(1holder's gain on the
sale, liquidation, or distribution from collapsible treatment if 70
per cent (or less) of that gain is attributable to the collapsible
property. Thus, if 30 per cent or more of his gain can be traced to
noncollapsible property, the entire gain will qualify for capital
treatment even though the corporation is collapsible.-l2 In com-
puting the gain attributable to the collapsible property for this
purpose, the regulations, section 1.341-4(c)(2), adopt a "but for"
approach, i.e., it is the excess of the gain recognized by the share-
holder over the gain that he would have recognized if the collap-
sible property had not been produced or purchased. (In the case
of a partial liquidation or nonliquidating distribution, this ap-
proach must be refined by taking account of the result that would
have been reached on a complete liquidation.) It is important to
note that income realized by the corporation in respect of its
collapsible property remains attributable to such property under
the regulations, and thus counts against the shareholder in apply-
41 The constructive ownership rules applicable to personal holding companies, section
544, are adopted for this purpose, except that the definition of ufamU,r" is expanded
to include brothers and sisters, and their spouses.
42 The 70 per cent rule of section 341(d) (2), which is concerned with the shareholder's
gain, should not be confused with the U substantial realization" element of the definition
of U collapsible corporation," which is applied solely at the corporate le\·e1. A realization
of 30 per cent of its potential collapsible income will free the corporation from collap-
sibility entirely (under the theory of Comm'r v. KcU)·, ~93 F.~d 90-1 (lith Cir. 1901»,
but the shareholder of a corporation that has rcalizcd nOlle of tlle income potential from
its collapsible property may still escape under section 341 (d) (2) if 30 per cent or mora
of his gain is attributable to noncollapsible property.
Nor should the 70 per cent rule be confused with the thrce·~·e:lr rule of section 3-11
(d) (3). The fact that the collnpsible property has been held b~' the corporation for
more than three years after construction is completed immunizr:s tho shareholder's gain
under section 341(d) (3); but if the shareholder is forced to rel,r on section 3U(d) (2),
t.he gain from such a project goes into the collapsible portion of his gain. Rev. Rul.
65-184, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 91.
See generally Goldstein, Section 341(d) alld (e)-A Journey Illto lb:t'er·1..crcr Land,
10 VILL. L. REv. 215 (1965).
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ing the 70 per cent rule, unless enough of the potential income is
realized at the corporate level to make the property noncollapsiblo.
Thus, if the corporation constructs two separate projeots, and
satisfies the "substantial realization" rule of section 341(b)(1) as
to one but not the other, all of the shareholder's gain that is attrib-
utable to the former project goes into the noncollapsible fraction
in applying section 341(d) (2), while all of his gain attributable to
the latter project (reflecting the corporation's realized as well
as its unrealized gain) goes into the collapsible fraction. An un-
intended side effect of the 70-30 per cent rule of section 341(d) (2)
is to encourage the retention of corporate income derived from
noncollapsible property; in the case of the two project corpora-
tion just described, a distribution by the corporation of its profits
on the noncollapsible property will make it more difficult for the
shareholder to meet the standard of section 341 (d) (2) on selling
his stock or liquidating the corporation.43
Under the cases and regulations, gain realized by the shareholder
is allocated to the collapsible share even if it is only indirectly
attributable to the collapsible property. Thus, in the case of real
estate improvements, an increase in the value of the land resulting
from a building project is treated as "collapsible" gain, as well as
the gain on the improvements themselves; and the same is true of
an increase in the value of undeveloped land if attributable to
improvements constructed on the developed portion.44 Similarly,
an increase in land value attributable to off site improvements
and a refund from a building contractor have been placed on the
collapsible side of the equation.45
43 See example 2 of section 1.341-5(d) of the regulations, where the shareholder would
have been saved from collapsible treatment had the corporation accumulated its profits
from the realized project rather than distributing them as a dividend.
Another method of diluting the tainted portion of the shareholder's gain would bo
to make capital contributions of appreciated noncollapsiblo assets (e.g., securities).
Such an attempt to shelter collapsible activities by contributing "puro" assots to tho
corporation may be vulnerable to the business purpose doctrine, although mero tax
avoidance, while often evoking judicial hostility, is not enough por so to vitiato a
transaction which otherwise has legal and economic substance. For a useful analogy
on this point, see W.H.B. Simpson, 43 T.C. 900 (1965); see also section 341(0) (7),
discussed in the text at note 050 infra.
HReg. Sec. 1.341-4(c)(3) ; Short v. Co='r, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962); Mintz v.
Co='r, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960); Payne v. Co='r, 268 F.2il 617 (5th Cir. 1959);
August v. Co='r, 267 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1959); Glickman v. Co= 'r, 256 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1958).
48 Spangler v. Co='r, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960). Seo gonorally Farber v. Comm'r,
312 F.2d 729 (2d Oir. 1963); Chodorow & Do Castro, How to Use tlic "70-30"
Exception to Avoid Collapsible Corporation Treatment, 21 J'. TAXATION 258 (1064).
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3. Gain, j'ealized after ezpi1"Qtion of 3 years. Ordinary gain treat-
ment may be avoided by a shareholder if the gain on his collapsible
corporation stock is realized more than three years after comple-
tion by the corporation 46 of production or purchase of collapsible
property. (The shareholder's holding period for his stock is irrele-
vant; section 341(d)(3) is concerned only with the corporation's
holding period for the property.) Although the statute is not
crystal clear on this point, it is not necessary for all of the cor-
poration's collapsible property to be held for three years to bring
section 341(d)(3) into play; part of the shareholder's gain may
qualify for relief under section 341(d) (3) even though the balance
is taxable as ordinary income 'because attributable to collapsible
property held for less than three years.41
Because the terms "manufacture, construction, and production"
have been given such an expansive meaning, the 3-year rule of
section 341(d) (3) is a treacherous exception: the waiting period
commences only on "completion' '-not partial or substantial com-
pletion-of the productive process. Moreover, production of "the"
property must be completed; if the corporation is engaged in multi-
unit construction activities, it may be difficult to say whether there
is only a single project, on which work is continuing, or several
projects, one or more of which have been completed.
Hopes have sometimes been built on the fact that section 341
(d) (3) speaks of gain "realized" after the 3-year period, since this
term suggests that a sale of stock on the installment plan or a com-
plete liquidation that is stretched out over a period of time will
postpone the date of "realization," at least as to the shareholder's
later receipts. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that gain is
realized when stock is sold, rather than when the payments are
received, if the shareholder elects under section 453 to report on
the installment method,4s but the taxpayer's case would be stronger
ifhe does not rely on such an election (e.g., a cash basis taxpayer's
sale of stock on a deferred payment plan if he does not receive
negotiable promissory notes or other evidences of indebtedness). If
the shareholder's gain or loss on a sale or liquidation cannot be
computed because a fair market value cannot be assigned to the
46 In Rev. Rul. 57-491, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 232, it WllS held that the 3'~'ear period of
section 341(d)(3) includes the holding period of certain predecessors.
47 Reg. Sec. 1.341-4(d). The balance of the gain might qualify under section 341(d)
(2), but in applying the 70-30 per cent rule, the gain on the three yctl.f property is
counted against the shareholder (see note 42 supra).
48 Rev. Rll1. 60-68, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 151.
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property received, his gain is probably not "realized" in applying
section 341(d)(3) until it can be computed; but such "open" trans-
actions are rarely encountered. Note, however, that if the Com-
missioner argues that distribution of potential corporate income
rights is a "realization" to the shareholders for purposes of seotion
341(d)(3), taxpayers then could argue that "realization" of the
income potential in those rights also had ocourred at the corporate
level, which fact could serve to cure collapsible status under the
basic definition of section 341(b)(1).
THE AMNESTY OF SECTION 341 (e)
Section 341 (e), enacted in 1958, ameliorates the rigors of the
collapsible corporation provisions. in four respects:
1. Sale or exchange of stock. If certain conditions are satisfied, a share-
holder's gain on the sale or exchange of the stock of an otherwise collapsiblo
corporation is exempted from section 341(a) (1), and hence will be taxed as
long-term capital gain.
2. Complete liquidation. In certain circumstances, a shareholder's gain on
the complete liquidation of an otherwise collapsible corporation is exempted
from section 341(a) (2), and hence will be taxed as long.term capital gain.
3. Eligibility for section 333. Certain otherwise collapsible corporations
are made eligible for the benefits of section 333 (elective nonrecognition of
shareholder gain on one month liquidations).
4. Eligibility for section 337. Certain otherwise collapsible corporations
are made subject to section 337 (nonrecognition of corporate gain or loss
on sales within a 12-month period following adoption of plan of complete
liquidation) .
The exemptions described in categories 1 and 2 above are granted
on an individual shareholder basis. Thus, some shareholders of a
corporation may qualify while others do not. The exemptions of
categories 3 and 4, however, are granted to the corporation itself.
Section 341 (e), it will be noted, does not apply to gain realized on
a partial liquidation or on a distribution in excess of the basis of
stock; these transactions continue subject to the unabated vigor of
section 341(a) (2) and (3).
Section 341 (e) is intended solely as a relief measure: it estab-
lishes a zone of safety, and any shareholder who can bring himself
within this zone is protected against the collapsible corporation
provisions, regardless of the nature of the corporation. Seotion
341(e) (11) also provides that the failure to meets its requirements
shall not be taken into account in determining whether a oorpora-
tion is a collapsible corporation under the statutory definition of
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section 341(b), and that this determination shall be made as if sec-
tion 341(e) had not been enacted.
The provisions of section 341(e) were thought necessary largely
because of the 1954 changes in section 341, under which a corpora-
tion formed or availed of to purchase rental property (e.g., an
apartment house) may be a collapsible corporation by virtue of
section 341(b) (3) (D), although the shareholders could in the alter-
native have acquired the property as individuals and reported their
gain on a sale as long-term capital gain uuless they were dealers
in such property.49 It is perilous to summarize the fearfully intri-
cate conditions of section 341 (e), but its underlying theory is that
the collapsible corporation provisions should not be applicable if
the net unrealized appreciation in the corporation's "subsection
(e) assets" (roughly speaking, property held by the corporation
which would produce ordinary income if sold by the corporation
itself or by its principal shareholders) amounts to less than 15
per cent of the corporation's net worth.:;o This theory is applied with
important variations to each of the four events listed above.
Before turning to these conditions and variations, we must first
examine the term "subsection (e) assets," a new phrase employed
throughout section 341(e) as the means of determining if there has
been a significant appreciation in the value of the corporation's
ordinary income assets. This term is defined by section 341(e) (5)-
(A) to include the following categories of property held by the
corporation:
1. Property not used in the trade or busi1lCSS• .Any such property is a.
49 In Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963), the Supremc Court refuscd to
provide a judicial escape for property that would ha'\"o constituted a capitnlllSSllt in tho
shareholders' hands, but this decision came after the enactment of scction 341(c) and
relied in part on the existence of this statutory escape.
For a special problem in the determination of U a Bubstantinl part of the UlxD.ble
income to be derived from such property" as it arises in tho oil and gas business, which
may have contributed to the enactment of section 341(0), seo Honaker Drlg., Inc. v.
Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960) j Hambrick, Collapsible Corporations in
Oil and Gas: Does the 1958 Act AfforilAny Relief!, ~8 GEO. W...su. L. REV. 8m (1960).
Section 341(e) is discussed in Boland, Collapsible Corporations Under t1w 1958
Amendments, 17 TAX L. REV. 203 (1962) j Goldstein, supra noto ~.
llO The terms "net unrealized appreciation" and "net worth" aro defined bj· scction
341(e)(6) and (7). In computing the corporation's "net worth," section 341(0)(7)
provides for the exclusion of increases in net worth during the preccding onc·year period
resulting from transfers for stock or as contributions to capital or paid·in surplus, ,.if
it appears that there was not a bona fide business purpose for tho tr~etion in respect
of which such amount was received." Compare the handling of n similar problem under
section 341(c) (2).
Imaged with the Permission of N.y.u. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 22 Tax L. Rev. 150 1966-1967
150 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:
"subsection (e) asset" if the corporation's gain on a sale would be taxed
as ordinary income-i.e., if the property is neither a capital asset nor seo-
tion 1231(b) property. Moreover-and this is section 341 (e) 's unique inno-
vation-property held by the corporation is brought into this category if in
the hands of any shareholder owning (directly or construotively) lil morc
tluun 20 per cent in value of the corporation's stock it would not be a capital
asset or section 1231(b) property. Thus, property held by the corporation
constitutes a "subsection (e) asset" if it is stock in trade, inventory prop-
erty, or property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade
or business in the hands of the corporation, or if it w01tld have this stat1ts
were it held by any shareholder owning more than 20 per cent of the corpo-
ration's stock. In other words, if any shareholder who holds more than 20
per cent of the outstanding stock is a dealer,li2 his status taints the corpo-
ration's property.
2. Property 1tsed in the trade or bltsiness-net ltnrealized deprcoiation.
If there is a net unrealized depreciation on assets used in the trade or busi-
ness, they constitute "subsection (e) assets." li3
3. Property 1tsed in the trade or bltsiness-net 1tnrealized appreciation.
If there is a net unrealized appreciation on such assets, they constitute
"subsection (e) assets" if they would be neither capital assets nor section
1231 (b) assets in the hands of a more-than.20-per cent shareholder. This
provision is crucial to the purpose of section 341(e). If a corporation's solo
property is an apartment house or other rental property that has appreci-
ated in value, the property will constitute a "subsection (e) asset" only if
a more-than-20-per cent shareholder is a dealer in such property.
Although the status of short term trade or business property is not en-
tirely clear, it would seem that it constitutes a "subsection (e) assot"; in
the case of trade or business property with a "split" holding period (i.e.,
property held for more than 6 months with improvements or additions
held for six months or less), the property evidently constitutes a "subsoc-
51 Throughout section 341 (e), constructive ownership rules aro applicablo. 800 section
341 (e) (8) and (10). Note also Reg. Sec. 1.341·6 (a) (4) stating that dealer status of
a more than 20 per cent constructive shareholder will be attributed to tho corporation
in determining whether its property constitutes "subsection (e) assets."
52 The term "dealer" is not used in the statute; it is em!lloyed here and in tho text
to denote a person who would treat gain from tho sale or exchange of tho property as in
whole or in part gain from a noncapital and non-section 1231(b) asset.
On the status of "dual purpose" property, held for investmont or salo, soo Malat v.
Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
See Reg. Sec. 1.341·6 (b) (4) stating that if a corporation holds property similar
to that held by a more than 20 per cent shareholder-dealer, such property will constitute
dealer property in the hands of the corporation (" segregation" is allowed, howover,
by Reg. Sec. 1.341-6(b) (5) in the case of corporate securities).
53 The Senate Report on section 341(e), 8. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1058),
does not state why depreciated property used in the trade or business is includod if
there is net unrealized depreciation in such assets. Since such assets would ordinarily
qualify for the hotchpot of section 1231(b), and give rise to ordinary lossos if tho not
result of the hotchpot were a loss, it may have been thought appropriate to includo thom
in the section 341(e) calculation in order to counterbalance appreciation in inventory
and similar property.
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tion (e) asset" in its entirety, but only the shor~term gain is taken into
account in computing "net unrealized appreciation." M
4. Oopyrights and similar property. A copyright, literary composition,
or similar property is a "subsection (e) asset" if it was created in whole
or in part by the personal efforts of an individual owning directly or con-
structively more than 5 per cent of the corporation's stock. By virtue of
this provision, a motion picture will be a "subsection (e) asset" if created
by the personal efforts of a more-than-5-per cent shareholder.
The function of the new category of "subsection (e) assets" is to
permit a determination of whether there has been a significant in-
crease in the value of the assets which would produce ordinary in-
come upon sale by either the corporation or a more-than-20-per cent
shareholder,55 since in the absence of such an increase in the value
of the ordinary income assets, there is to be relief from the collaps-
ible corporation restrictions. As stated earlier, however, this test is
applied with variations to each of the four situations to which
section 341(e) is applicable, and we now turn to these variations.
1. Sale or exchange of stock. Section 341(e){1) makes section
341(a) (1) inapplicable to a sale or exchange of stock if the net un-
realized appreciation in the corporation's "subsection (e) assets"
does not exceed 15 per cent of the corporation's net worth and if
the shareholder does not own more than 5 per cent of the corpora-
tion's stock.56 If the shareholder owns between 5 and 20 per cent
of the stock, a similar calculation is made, but it must take into
account not only the corporation's "subsection (e) assets" but also
any corporate assets which would produce ordinary income if
held by the particular shareholder for whom the calculation is
made.57 And if the shareholder owns more than 20 per cent of the
stock, his calculation must also take into account any corporate
assets which would have produced ordinary income (a) if he owned
them and (b) if 7ze had held in his individual capacity the property
of certain other corporations of which he owned 'more than 20 per
cent of the stock i1~ the preceding 3 years.G8
Thus, the corporate assets will be tainted by the dealer status of
any shareholder owning more than 20 per cent of the stock of the
54 See sections 341(e)(6)(D) and 341(e)(9).
55 Five per cent in the case of a copyright, lirerary composition, or similar property.
56 Sueh a shareholder might find it simpler to take refuge in section 341(d) (1), which
makes section 341(a) inapplicable to certain not·more·than·5·per cent shareholders, but
that sanctuary is closed to a shareholder who owned moro than 5 per cent of the stock
at any Me after manufacturer, etc., commenced, lIB well lIB to a shnreholder (c.g., an
estate or trust) whose shares are attributed to a more·than·5·per cent shareholder.
Section 341(e)(1) is not quite so exclusive.
57LE.C. § 341(e)(1)(B).
58LE.C. § 341(e) (l)(C).
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corporation-and this "taint" will affect all shareholders of the
corporation, regardless of the size of their shareholc1ings. In addi-
tion, a shareholder owning more than 5 per cent of the stock must
take into account any other corporate assets which would be
ordinary income assets if he held them in his personal capacity-
but this" taint" will affect only him. Finally, as to a more-than-20-
per cent shareholder, any corporate assets will be tainted by the
hypothetical dealer status he would have attained if he had engaged
in certain transactions as an individual rather than in corporate
form, during the preceding 3 years.
The net result of these extraordinary statutory gyrations is that
profit on the sale of stock of an otherwise collapsible corporation
will qualify as long-term capital gain unless the assets of the corpo-
ration reflect a significant amount of unrealized ordinary income-
the corporate veil being pierced for the purpose of determining the
amount of unrealized ordinary income, in order to take account of
assets that might have changed their character by the interposition
of a corporation between the shareholders and the assets.
To illustrate the operation of section 341(e) (1), assume that a corpora-
tion has three stockholders, unrelated to each other, whose holdings by












Stock in trade in hands of corporation.
Capital asset to corporation; but
would be stock in trade if helel by C,
though not if held by A or B.
Capital asset to corporation; but
would be stock in trade if helcl by B,
though not if held by A or C.
Capital asset to corporation; but
would be stock in trade if held by C,
but only if sales by certain corpora-
tions in which C was interested during
preceding 3 years were treated as sales
by C or if sales by C of stock in such
corporations were treated as sales by
him of his share of assets.
Under section 341(e) (5) (A), the corporation's "subsection (0) assets"
would include Classes Wand X. Consequently, on a sale of stock by A the
net unrealized appreciation of the corporation would be $20,000, and if
A 5 per cent
B 15 per cent
C 80 per cent.
Assume also that the corporation's assets fall into foul' categories, as
follows:
Class
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this does not exceed 15 per cent of the corporation's net worth, the corpora-
tion could not be collapsible as to A. On a sale of stock by B, bowever, the
net unrealized appreciation would be $30,000, since section 341(e) (1) (A)
and (B) require him to take into account not only the corporation's "sub-
section (e) assets)) (Classes W and X), but also any corporate assets which
would be "subsection (e) assets)) if be held more than 20 per cent of the
stock (Class Y). B, therefore, can take advantage of section 341(e)(1)
only if $30,000 does not exceed 15 per cent of the corporation's n('t worth.
Finally, if C invokes section 341(e)(1), he must take into account Classes
W, X, and Z (but not Class Y) in determining the net unr('alized appre-
ciation.59 For him, section 341(e) (1) will be applicable only if $40,000 does
not exceed 15 per cent of the corporation's net worth.
For another example, which is both simpler and more typical of
section 341(e) 's intended operation, assume a corporation (Smith-
Jones, Inc.) owned equally by Smith and Jones (who are unre-
lated), the sole asset of which is an appreciated apartment house.
Assume also that neither Smith nor Jones is a dealer in such prop-
erty, but that Jones has owned more than 20 per cent of the stock
of certain other real estate corporations during the preceding 3
years. In these circumstances, Smith-Jones, Inc. owns no CCsubsec-
tion (e) assets," either in its own right or by attribution from
Smith or Jones. As to Smith, the net unrealized appreciation under
section 341(e) (1) is zero, so a sale or exchange of his stock (except
to the issuing corporation or to ace related person' ') is exempt from
the operation of section 341(a) (1). As to Jones, it is necessary to
determine whether more than 70 per cent in value of the assets of
any of the other corporations are similar or related in use or service
to the property held by Smith-Jones, Inc. If so, Jones is to be
treated (a) as though any sale or exchange by him of stock in such
other corporation (while he owned more than 20 per cent of its
stock) had been a sale by him of his proportionate share of the
corporation's assets, and (b) as though any sale or exchange by
such other corporation (while he owned more than 20 per cent of
its stock) which was subject to section 337(a) had been a sale by
J ones of his proportionate share of the property. If, taking into
account these hypothetical sales or exchanges by Jones, he would
have been a dealer in the type of property held by Smith-Jones,
Inc.,6° he can make use of section 341(e) (1) only if the net unreal-
59 LR.O. § 341(e)(I)(A) and (0).
60 When section 341(e)(1)(0) is applicable, the shareholder is trented DS though he
had sold his proportionate share of property held by the other corporntions during the
preceding 3-year period. The mere fact that these corporations were or were not denlers
in the proper~ in question is not rele\"ant; the purpose of imputing sales to the sharir
holder is to determine 7lis status, based on both these hypothetical sales and any actunl
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ized appreciation in the apartment building owned by Smith-Jones,
Inc., does not exceed 15 per cent of its net worth.
Section 341(e) (1) cannot be invoked if the stock is sold to the
issuing corporation,61 nor does it apply to a more-than-20-per cent
shareholder if the stock is sold to a "related person" as defined by
section 341(e) (8).
2. Complete liquidations. .A. shareholder's gain on a complete
liquidation is exempted by section 341(e) (2) from section 341 (a)-
(2)-and hence can enjoy long-term capital gain treatment-if two
conditions are met. The first is that the net unrealized appreciation
in the corporation's assets must meet the same test as is imposed by
section 341 (e) (1), i.e., the appreciation in the corporation's" sub-
section (e) assets" plus, in the case of shareholders owning more
than 5 or 20 per cent of the stock, the appreciation in certain other
assets held by the corporation, may not exceed 15 per cent of the
corporation's net worth. The second condition is that section 337(a)
applies to the corporation by reason of section 341 (e) (4). This con-
dition, as will be seen infra, cannot be satisfied unless the corpora-
tion sells substantially all of its property before the liquidation; its
purpose is to prevent a liquidation in kind of assets subject to de-
preciation or depletion, which if permitted would give the share-
holders a stepped-up basis for such assets (which could thereafter
be written off against ordinary income) at the capital gain rate,
the classic situation covered by section 341.
3. Elective one-month liquidations ~tnder section 333. Ordinarily,
the shareholders of a collapsible corporation are excluded from sec-
tion 333 (elective nonrecognition of shareholder gain on a com-
plete liquidation within one calendar month). Section 341(e)(3)
provides that a corporation shall not be considered collapsible for
this purpose, however, if the unrealized appreciation in its "sub-
section (e) assets" does not exceed 15 per cent of the corporation's
net worth. The term" subsection (e) assets" Is modified in apply-
ing section 341 (e) (3), so as to reduce from 20 per cent to 5 per cent
sales by him of similar properties held in his individual capncity. Tho number and fre·
quency of sales are usually only two of the factors determining whether the tnxpllyer
is a dealer, however, and it is not clear whether sectien 34I(e) (1) (0) attributes to tho
shareholder not enly his proportionate share of the corporations' assets, but also his
share of any corporate activity (use of agents, advertising, etc.) that might have resultod
in the sales.
61 This restriction may reflect an excess of caution, since section 341(0)(1) is an
exception to section 341 (a) (1), which embraces sales and exchanges of stock, but not
partial or complete liquidations. As to section 302 (b) redemptions, howover, see note 10
supra.
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the stock ownership that will impose the shareholder's dealer status
on the corporate assets. If the corporation can meet the test of
section 341(e) (3), all shareholders may take advantage of section
333; otherwise, section 333 (a) remains in full force and no share-
holders may do SO.62
4. Use of section 337 by a collapsible corpo1·ation. Generally
speaking, section 337 (nonrecognition of corporate gain or loss on
certain sales within the one-year period following the adoption of
a plan of complete liquidation) is not applicable to a collapsible
corporation. Section 341(e) (4), however, lifts this barrier to a lim-
ited extent, making an otherwise collapsible corporation subject
to section 337 if:
(a) At all times following the adoption of the plan of complete liquida-
tion, the net unrealized appreciation in its "subsection (e) nssets" does not
exceed 15 per cent of its net worth;
(b) It sells substantially all the property owned by it on the date the plan
of liquidation was adopted within the 12-month period following that dnte;
and
(c) Following the adoption of the plan, it does not distribute any depre-
ciable or similar property.
The first of the foregoing conditions (with variations noted
above) is common to section 341(e) (1), (2), (3), and (4)-relief
from the collapsible corporation provisions is granted only to cor-
porations whose ordinary income assets have not appreciated sig-
nificantly in value. Thus, the shareholders of a corporation holding
substantially appreciated assets that in its hands are (or in the
hands of any more-than-20-per cent shareholder would be) inven-
tory property or stock in trade may not employ section 337 to
obtain capital gain on a sale by having the corporation sell the
property and distribute the proceeds in liquidation. The second and
third conditions have a different purpose: even if the corporation's
ordinary income assets have not appreciated substantially in value,
the corporation is not permitted to distribute some of its assets in
kind to its shareholders in order to give them a stepped-up basis at
the lenient long-term capital gain rate. Thus, the second condition
requires the corporation to sell substantially all of its assets if it
wishes to come under section 337; it may not sell some, and transfer
the rest by a liquidating distribution in kind to its shareholders.
The third condition overlaps the second to a considerable degree:
62 Unless a particular shareholder is protected from section 341 tre3tment by one of
the exceptions in section 341(d). :Rev. :Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 ClP..L BULL. 74.
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it forbids the distribution of corporate property that is depreciable
(or subject to amortization or depletion) in the hands of either the
corporation or the distributee. Since the second condition requires
"substantially all of the properties" held by the corporation when
the plan of liquidation is adopted to be sold within the 12-month
period thereafter, the third condition would be automatically satis-
fied as to such properties, but it has the additional effect of prevent-
ing the distribution of any depreciable, amortizable, and depletable
properties that fall outside the "substantially all" clause or that
were not held by the corporation when the plan of liquidation was
adopted. If property is distributed before the plan is formally
adopted in an effort to avoid the impact of these conditions, the
plan may be "pre-dated."
A final restriction in section 341 (e) (4) makes it inapplicable to
any sale to a more-than-20-per cent shareholder, or to a person
related to such a shareholder, if the property so sold is subject to
depreciation, depletion, or amortization in the hands of either tho
corporation or the buyer. By virtue of this restriction, section
341(e) (4) and hence section 337 may be applicable to some of the
corporation's sales but not to others, so that an otherwise collaps-
ible corporation may employ section 337 to ward off gain on some
sales, while avoiding section 337 on sales producing losses (by
selling to a more-than-20-per cent shareholder), an ironic result in
view of the effort to prevent corporations from straddling section
337. The irony will be heightened by the fact that the shareholder,
not the government, will be seeking to establish that the corporation
is collapsible. Another problem in this final restriction on section
341(e) (4) is whether a "sale" of appreciated corporate property
to shareholders pro rata (e.g., if two 50 per cent shareholders each
"purchase" a 50 per cent interest in depreciable assets) will be
treated as a true sale. If so, the corporation will be subject to tax
on the sale (probably under section 1231(a), at the capital gain
rate), but the shareholders will obtain a stepped-'!1P basis for the
property; at the same time, the other sales by the corporation will
be subject to section 337, and the liquidation will produce capital
gain for the shareholders by virtue of section 341(e) (2). If, on the
other hand, the transaction is treated as a distribution in kind of
the property, rather than as a "sale" followed by a distribution of
the proceeds of sale, section 341(e) (4) (B) and (0) will have been
violated, with the result that section 337 will not apply to the corpo-
ration's sales of other property. This, in turn, will make section
341(e) (2) inapplicable at the shareholder level to the liquidation.
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AVOIDANCE OF SECTION 341 BY A SECTION 341(f) CONSENT
Not content with the three original escape hatches of section
341(d) and the labyrinthine route of section 341(e), Congress pro-
vided further relief from section 341 in 1964 by enacting the consent
procedure of section 341(f).63 This provision permits a shareholder
to sell his stock on the normal capital gain basis, free of any threat
from section 341(a), if the corporation consents to recognize gain
on its "subsection (f) assets" (primarily, real estate and non-
capital assets) when, as and if it disposes of them in a transaction
that would otherwise qualify for nonrecognition of its gain. Such
a consent insures that the gain on the collapsible property will be
recognized at the corporate level regardless of the mode employed
by the corporation to dispose of the property; just as the share-
holder has always been protected against the application of section
341(a) if the corporation realizes a substantial part of the collaps-
ible income before he disposes of his stock, so section 341(f) pro-
tects him if the corporation promises to recognize the collapsible
income after he sells his stock. Accordingly, a "consenting corpora-
tion" will not be able to avail itself of such nonrecognition provi-
sions as section 311, section 336 or section 337 when it ultimately
disposes of its "subsection (f) assets." Whether the corporate
gain will be taxable at that time as capital gain or as ordinary
income, however, will depend on its status and the statutory rules
then in force. Similarly, the amount of the gain (if any) will depend
on the property's adjusted basis and the amount realized (or, if the
disposition is not by sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion, on
its fair market value) at the time of disposition. A consent under
section 341(f) is not conditioned on a showing that the corporation
is in fact collapsible; indeed, one of the advantages of section
341(f) is that it permits avoidance of such a determination. If the
consent is filed, however, it cannot be repudiated at a later time on
the ground that it was an empty formality because the sharchold-
er's gain was not within the scope of section 341.
1. Requirements and effect of section 341(/). Section 341(f) ap-
plies only to a "true" sale of stock, not to transactions that are
assimilated to sales for some purposes (e.g., distributions in re-
demption of stock, partial or complete liquidations, or nonliquidat-
ing distributions). To qualify for section 341(f) (1) treatment, the
63 See Hall, The COMenting Collapsible Corporation-Section 8.J1(f) of tlw Internal
llevenue Code of 1954, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1365 (1965); Sinrich, l{ellJ Collapsible Relief
Measure is MOTe UsefuZ than Most Taz Men Belie!:£', :1~ J. TAXATIO~ 148 (l9GS); S. REP.
No. 1241, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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corporation, and any subsidiary (or chain of subsidiaries) con~
nected by stock ownership of 5 per cent in value, must file a consent
to the special recognition of gain provisions of section 341(f)(2).
This consent becomes irrevocable as soon as any shareholder has
effected a sale of his stock. Section 341(f) (2) then provides for
recognition of gain at the corporate level on the ultimate disposi~
tion of all "subsection (f) assets," even in a transaction that would
otherwise qualify for nonrecognition of gain-subject to an excep~
tion for tax-free exchanges under section 332 (liquidation of sub~
sidiary), section 351 (transfer to controlled corporation), section
361 (corporate reorganization), section 371(n) and section 374(n)
(bankruptcy reorganizations), if the basis of the assets carries
over to the transferee and it files a similar consent to recognize gain
when it disposes of them.
For six months after the filing of a consent, any shareholder may
safely sell stock of the consenting corporation in one or a number of
transactions. When the consent expires, a new one may be filed,
which will be similarly effective for a 6-month period, whether the
shareholders have made sales under the prior consent or not; and
this process may be continued indefinitely. The use of the privilege
with respect to one corporation, however, precludes the same share-
holc1er, or any person related to him within the meaning of section
341 (e) (8) (A), from using it with respect to any other corporation
for a 5-year period. There is a "first-in~first-out" quality to this
one-shot rule, in that a shareholder cannot disregard a consent
applicable to his first sale of stock (either because he had no gain or
because he is prepared to prove that the corporation was noncol-
lapsible) in order to get the benefit of a consent filed by another
corporation whose stock he sells at a later time.
"Subsection (f) assets" are defined in section 341 (f) (4) as those
noncapital assets which the corporation owns, or has an option to
acquire, at the date of any qualified sale of stock by a shareholder.
Whether they would otherwise constitute noncapital assets or not,
however, land, any interest in real property (except a mortgage or
other security interest), and unrealized receivables or fees as de-
fined by section 341 (b)(4) constitute "subsection (f) assets"; and
so do two other categories of property: (a) if any assets of the
above categories are being manufactured at the time the stock is
sold, the property resulting thereafter from the manufacturing
process; and (b) in the case of land or real property, any improve~
ments resulting from construction commencing within two years
after the date stock is sold. As already noted, the character and
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amount of the corporation's gain on disposing of its "subsection
(f) assets" depend on their status at the time of disposition, not on
their status when the consent is filed or the stock is sold.
2. Uses of section 341(f). Section 341(f) was designed to allow
the shareholders of a rapidly growing corporation, whose produced
or purchased properties have substantially increased in value but
have not given rise to a realization of income at the corporate level,
to reap the benefit of the company's prospects by selling their stock
to a buyer who intends to continue operation of the corporation as a
going concern. A sale in such circumstances invites a dispute under
section 341, and any tincture of "dealership" on the part of the
corporation or its shareholders makes it perilous to rely on section
341(e). Section 341(f) intervenes at this point to provide a safe
harbor for the sellers if the new shareholders are willing to have
the potential profit recognized in future years at the corporate
level. If the buyers are not willing to continue the corporation as a
going concern, however, but intend to liquidate it to acquire the
assets, section 341(f) gives no practical assistance to the selling
shareholders, since the buyers (at least if they are competently
advised) will discount the price to reflect the corporate tax liability
which will be generated by section 341(f) (2) at the time of the
liquidation. Moreover, even if they intend to keep the corporation
alive, the buyers must take account of its low basis for the assets,
since this will be reflected in an increase in corporate gain (or in
reduced depreciation deductions) and will adversely affect the
value of their shares. Although incoming shareholders can ordinar-
ily remedy an abnormally low basis for corporate assets by liqui-
dating the corporation and getting a stepped-up basis under section
334(a) or section 334(b) (2), such a liquidation of a consenting
corporation is a taxable event.
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH SECTION 341
While the reach of the collapsible corporation provision is indeed
broad, even excessively so, several techniques are available to miti-
gate or avoid its application. A check list of these possibilities,
some of which are discussed above, would include:
1. Selling the assets under section, 337. If the corporation is found to be
noncollapsible, the corporate gain will go unrecognized; and there will be
a tax at the shareholder level only. If, to the contrary, the corporation is
collapsible, the realization of income at the corporate level (resnlting,
usually, in capital gain) will serve to oust section 341 of jurisdiction. The
tax at the shareholder level will, in such a case, qualify for capital gain
treatment.
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2. Realization at the corporate level. In jurisdictions following Oommis.
sioner v. Kelly,64. realization of one-third (or more) of the potential income
at the corporate level will avoid collapsible status for the corporation.
3. Election 1tnder subchapter S. If there is to be a sale of the corporate
assets, the shareholders may be able to qualify for a single tax at the capital
gain rate by an election under subchapter S prior to the sale. This possi.
bility, however, was drastically curtailed by a statutory change in 1966
under which there may be a tax at the corporate level as well as at the
shareholder level.65
4. Multiple corporations. By segregating each potentially collapsible
project in a separate corporation, the shareholders may fight the "substan-
tial realization" and "tainted view" issues separately for each corporation
-provided they stand up as independent entities. Segregation also has its
drawbacks, e.g., gain on noncollapsible projects cannot be balanced against
the gain on collapsible projects in applying section 341(d) (2).
5. Statutory escape routes. At the shareholder level, reliance may be
placed on the exemptions created by section 341 (d) for 5·per cent share-
holders, the 70-30 per cent ru1e, and the 3-year waiting period i or on the
special ru1e applied by section 341(e) to "subsection (e) assets." At the
corporate level, a consent under section 341 (f) may be feasible.
6. Spread-out or splitting of ordinary income. If ordinary income cannot
be avoided, or if the shareholder is forced to rely on an escape route that
may prove unavailing, his pain and suffering may be reduced by spreading
the gain over a period of years (e.g., by use of the installment method under
section 453) or among a number of taxpayers (e.g., children, trusts, etc.).
7. Oharitable contributions. If all else fails, the taxpayer can donate
collapsible stock to a charitable institution,66 thereby avoiding the recogni.
tion of gain while deducting the value of the stock under section 170.
64293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
65 See I.R.C. § 1378.
66 The authors would be happy to introduce persons wishin(: to employ this suggestion
to the treasurers of their respective universities.
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